Terrorism: The Politics of Prosecution
Madeline Morris*

International terrorism lies at the cusp of crime, states' domestic politics,
and international relations. Precisely because terrorist offenses are poised at that
volatile intersection, significant practical, legal, and political difficulties attend the
exercise of criminal jurisdiction over terrorist crimes in any forum. Prosecutions
in the domestic courts of affected states pose one set of concerns, while
prosecutions in an international criminal court-or in the domestic courts of
third-party states under universal jurisdiction-pose others. This essay examines
the factors underlying the jurisdictional difficulties in this field and considers the
implications of those factors for future policy.
I. THE IMPETUS TO INTERNATIONALIZE ENFORCEMENT
Most crime is prosecuted at the national, not the international, level. This is
true even of cross-border crime. For the most part, states criminalize conduct
domestically. Where states need to cooperate with other states to enforce their
domestic criminal law, they do so through mutual legal assistance agreements,
extradition treaties, coordination of investigations, and the like. Terrorism,
however, is not ordinary crime. It is not even ordinary cross-border crime.
Although the term "terrorism" has no international legal definition, the term
would seem to indicate, at a minimum, an unlawful violent act committed for a
political purpose. Since terrorism has political motives, states typically are the
targets and, not infrequently, the sponsors of terrorism. This fact enormously
complicates the issue of criminal jurisdiction over terrorism. The likely
involvement of states as targets or sponsors of terrorism creates an impetus to
resort to some authority for the handling of terrorist offenses that is outside the
state that is the sponsor or target of the terrorist act. Such outside authorities
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might include the UN Security Council, the International Criminal Court, or a
third-party state operating under universal jurisdiction.

II. INTERNATIONALIZED ENFORCEMENT FROM A POLICY
PERSPECTIVE
It is easy to understand the impulse to resort to international or universal
jurisdiction for the handling of terrorist offenses when the alternative would be
to rely for law enforcement on the very state that has sponsored the terrorist act.
Take, for instance, the bombing of Pan Am flight 103, the flight that exploded
over Lockerbie, Scotland. It appears that the bombing was in fact sponsored by
the government of Libya.'
The Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against
the Safety of Civil Aviation criminalizes and provides for the prosecution of
aircraft bombing.2 Libya, the UK, and the US each were parties to that treaty at
all times relevant to the Lockerbie case.3 The Montreal Convention provides that
whenever an individual suspected of aircraft bombing is found on the territory
of a state party to the treaty, that state must either prosecute or extradite the
suspect.4 This provision for "aut dedere, autjudicare" is quite standard in the
several multilateral treaties dealing with what would generally be thought of as
"terrorist offenses."5

2

Libya has accepted responsibility for the bombing. See Letter from the Representative of the
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to the President of the UN Security Council (Aug 15, 2003); see also
Security Council Res No 731, UN Doc S/RES/731 at Preamble (1992).
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation (Sabotage) (1971), 24 UST 565

3

(1974) (hereinafter Montreal Convention).
See Aerial Incidents and the Libyan ArabJamabiriya,46 YB of the UN 52 (1992).

4

Specifically, Article 7 of the Montreal Convention (cited in note 2) provides: "The Contracting
state in the territory of which the alleged offender is found shall, if it does not extradite him, be
obliged, without exception whatsoever and whether or not the offence was committed in its
territory, to submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution."

5

See Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (Hijacking) (1970), 22 UST
1641 (1972) (hereinafter Seizure of Aircraft); Montreal Convention (cited in note 2); Protocol for
the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation,
Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil
Aviation, Done at Montreal on 23 September 1971 (1988), S Treaty Doc No 100-19 (1990)
(hereinafter Suppression of Unlawful Acts at Airports); International Maritime Organization:
Convention and Protocol from the International Conference on the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (1988), 27 ILM 668 (hereinafter Maritime
Navigation); International Convention against the taking of hostages (1979), 1316 UNTS 205
(1983); Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons,
Including Diplomatic Agents (1973), 28 UST 1975 (1978) (hereinafter Protected Persons);
Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel (1994), UN Doc No
A/RES/49/59, 34 ILM 482 (1995); International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist
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The two suspects in the Lockerbie case lived in Libya and were Libyan
nationals. Libya indicated that it would prosecute the suspects in its own national
courts. Since there was evidence that Libya had sponsored the bombing, this
posed a problem. The UK and the US insisted that Libya not prosecute the
suspects but, rather, extradite them to the US or the UK for prosecution. The
issue was presented to the UN Security Council. Based on the evidence that
Libya itself was implicated in the crime, the Security Council issued Resolution
748, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, effectively requiring the extradition
of the suspects.6
Libya took the position that the Security Council lacked the authority to
against the
issue that resolution. This dispute resulted in cases brought by Libya
7
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At the base of that dispute is the legal problem posed by state sponsorship
of terrorism. Libya, which would ordinarily have been responsible for the
enforcement of the law against aircraft sabotage in this case, hardly could be
relied upon for that purpose if the government of Libya was responsible for the
crime. In this respect, the terrorism treaties, with their "prosecute-or-extradite"
structures for jurisdiction, have a built-in limitation: they do not provide for the
foreseeable circumstance in which the crime was sponsored by the state having
custody of the suspect.
State-sponsored terrorism has led logically to an impetus toward some
form of supranational or extraterritorial authority for the handling of terrorist
offenses. Resort to such an outside authority is sought to prevent perpetrators
being shielded from justice by the states that have sponsored their terrorist acts.

6
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Bombings (1998), UN Doc No A/RES/52/164, 37 ILM 249 (1996); International Convention
for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (1999), UN Doc No A/RES/54/109, 39 ILM
270 (2000). For an analysis of the jurisdictional provisions of the terrorism treaties and their legal
bases and implications, see Madeline Morris, High Crimes and Misconceptions: The ICC and Non-Party
States, 64 L & Contemp Probs 13, 60-66 (2001).
See Security Council Res No 748, UN Doc No S/RES/748 at 1 (1992).
See Application Instituting Proceedings (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v United Kingdom), ICJ Gen List No 88
(filed Mar 3, 1992), available online at <http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iluk/ilukord/
ilukjiappication_920303.htm> (visited Oct 18, 2004); Application InstitutingProceedings(ibyan Arab
Jamahirya v United States of America), ICJ Gen List No 89 (filed Mar 3, 1992), available online at
(visited
<http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/ilus/ilusorder/ilus-iapplication-920303.htm>
Oct 18, 2004). At the joint request of the parties, on September 10, 2003, the ICJ ordered these
cases to be discontinued with prejudice. Case ConcerningQuestions of Intetpretationand Application of the
1971 Montreal Convention Arisingfrom the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Iabyan Arab Jamahiriyav United
Kingdom), 2003 ICJ 149 (Sept 10, 2003); Case ConcerningQuestions of Interpretationand Application of the
1971 Montreal Convention Arisingfrom the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Jamahiriyav United States of
America), 2003 ICJ 152 (Sept 10, 2003). That joint request for discontinuance of the cases
followed the resolution of the dispute through political channels. See Letter from the
Representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to the President of the UN Security Council (cited
in note 1).
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The US and UK resorted to a, supranational authority in responding to
state sponsorship of terrorist crimes in the Lockerbie bombing case. In that
instance, the authority was the UN Security Council. To be sure, the purpose of
recourse to the Security Council was to gain custody of the defendants for
criminal prosecution in the domestic criminal courts of the US or UK. But the
route through which that outcome was sought to be attained was the
supranational authority of the Security Council.
Another supranational mechanism that some have proposed for the
handling of terrorism cases is the International Criminal Court ("ICC").8 The
ICC would both provide the supranational authority to assure that the case
would be pursued and also constitute the criminal forum in which the case
would actually be tried.
The prospect of the ICC serving as an international forum for the
prosecution of terrorism presents a number of questions. After considering, in
this section, the broad policy issues concerning international jurisdiction over
terrorism that arise from the political nature of terrorist offenses, the final
section of the essay will consider particular legal questions concerning the ICC's
capacity to adjudicate international terrorism cases.
While it is easy to understand the impulse to internationalize law
enforcement-through the Security Council or the ICC or universal
jurisdiction-where the state that would otherwise be relied upon for law
enforcement is itself implicated in terrorist offenses, it is more difficult to
understand the impulse to internationalize law enforcement where the state that
would otherwise exercise jurisdiction is not the perpetrator state but, rather, the
state that was the target of the crime. Why is it, then, that when the United
States suffered terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, there were suggestions
that prosecutions should be conducted outside of the courts of the United
States, in third-party states, or in an international tribunal? One primary reason
appears to be that the US was viewed, in effect, as a "party to the conflict." The
courts of the United States, it was said, could not be relied upon to be neutral or,
in any case, might be perceived to be nonneutral. Therefore, some argued, the
case should be handled by an entity outside of the principally affected state: an
international court or a third-party state exercising universal jurisdiction.
In fact, this was essentially the same argument as was made by Libya before
the ICJ in the Lockerbie case, and the same concern as was expressed by several
8

The ICC was established pursuant to a multilateral treaty. Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, 37 ILM 1002 (1998) (hereinafter ICC Treaty). The ICC had not been established
at the time of the Lockerbie bombing. However, the use of an ad hoc international criminal
tribunal was proposed, though ultimately rejected at that time, as a jurisdictional resolution for the
Lockerbie dispute. See James Crawford, The ILC Adopts a Statutefor an InternationalCriminalCourt,
89 AmJ Intl L 404, 408 (1995).
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of the ICJ judges dissenting from the ICJ's 1992 opinion denying provisional
measures in that case. Judge Shahabuddeen questioned whether the accused
could receive an impartial trial in the United States.9 Judge ad hoc El-Kosheri
stated that the accused "could not possibly receive a fair trial, neither in the
United States or in the United Kingdom, nor in Libya."10
The impulse to internationalize justice processes in this area is an explicable
and, perhaps, logical response to the recognition that crimes of terrorism have a
political component. Because of the political aspect of international terrorism
cases, the reasoning goes, states (be they perpetrator states or target states) are
interested parties in these cases. As interested parties, these states should not be
permitted to stand as judges in their own causes.
Internationalization of justice in this field might be a tidy solution to this
problem if there were an international institution that states trusted sufficiently
to decide these matters. The problem is that this sort of confidence in
international institutions is frequently lacking for comprehensible reasons.
States accused of sponsoring terrorism question the legitimacy and the
neutrality of the international institutions or third-party states that would assert
authority. Certainly, Libya has challenged the Security Council's action on both
of these grounds in the Lockerbie case.
Significantly, states that are the targets of terrorism also have been
unwilling to rely upon international handling of those cases. A targeted state may
question the effectiveness of international investigative and prosecutorial
mechanisms-particularly if the targeted state has highly developed investigative
and prosecutorial systems domestically, and has substantial resources to devote
to the cases. Targeted states also are aware that different states have different
interests; not all states are similarly situated relative to terrorism. Targeted states
may therefore be unwilling to relegate the handling of terrorism cases to an
international court that may have different priorities from those of the targeted
state. In addition, a targeted state may question whether the international
institution that would handle the cases will share the state's view of the law in
this field in which there remain so many differences of interpretation and open
legal questions." All of these considerations also may generate domestic pressure
9

10
1

Case Concerning.Questionsof InterpretationandApplication of the 1971 MontrealConvention Arisingfrom the
Aerial Incident atLockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamairiyav United States ofAmerica), 1992 ICJ 114, 141 (Apr
14, 1992) (separate opinion of Shahabuddeen).
Id at 216 (El-Kosheri dissenting).
The definition of "terrorism" has itself remained highly controversial. The UN General Assembly
debates following September 11, 2001, reflected the highly contentious nature of this question,
with Middle East politics virtually assuring that no international consensus on a definition will be
arrived at in the near future. See, for example, T. Christian Miller, US Strikes Back; Islamic Summit
Implies Its Support, LA Times A31 (Oct 11, 2001).
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on targeted states not to relinqUishi control over the prosecutions. Precisely
because terrorist crimes do pose a threat to the national security of targeted
states, and precisely because terrorist crimes do have critical political and
foreign-relations dimensions,, states are particularly wary of relinquishing control
over these cases to international bodies.
Having identified some of the difficulties that attend international
jurisdiction over crimes of terrorism, it quickly becomes clear that a similar set
of weaknesses affects the option of holding terrorism trials in the domestic
courts of third-party states under universal jurisdiction. Under the international
legal doctrine of universal jurisdiction, any state may prosecute individuals for
certain international crimes without regard to the territory where the crimes were
committed or the nationality of perpetrators or victims.' 2 Universal jurisdiction is
thus distinguished from other internationally recognized bases for jurisdiction by
the fact that universal jurisdiction is not based on a particular nexus between the
offense and the prosecuting state.' 3
Two distinct arguments are made in favor of universal jurisdiction over
terrorism cases. The first is that terrorist crimes are of concern to all states. The
second is that third-party states may be relied upon to be more impartial in
terrorism cases than the principally affected states. Neither of those arguments
withstands scrutiny.
The first argument for universal jurisdiction over terrorism, that all states
have an interest in ensuring accountability for terrorist crimes, is belied by the
very existence of state-sponsored terrorism. But, even if we were to accept,
arguendo, the existence of such a unity of interest, at least among states that do
not themselves sponsor terrorist crimes (a point which certainly could be
debated), the interests of states obviously diverge on a great number of other
matters. Because criminal trials for terrorism do not exist in isolation from those
other aspects of interstate relations, we may anticipate that universal jurisdiction
would sometimes be used as a tool for achieving other political ends. For this
reason, third-party states may not be consistently relied upon to be impartial in
the handling of terrorism-related cases. Therein lies the flaw in the second
argument for universal jurisdiction: that third-party states can be relied upon as
neutral adjudicators in relation to terrorist acts.

12

See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations §§ 404, 423 (1987).

13

Universal jurisdiction is one of the five bases for jurisdiction comprising the standard list of
internationally recognized forms of jurisdiction. Each of the other four jurisdictional bases
(territoriality, nationality, passive personality, and protective principle) is founded on a particular
nexus between the offense and the state asserting jurisdiction. See generally Kenneth C. Randall,
UniversalJurisdicionunder InternationalLaw,66 Tex L Rev 785, 785-88 (1988).
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Certainly, we can envision a state selectively, targeting for prosecution the
officials of another state with which it is in conflict. But, beyond the blatant use
of universal jurisdiction to pursue an opponent state in the courtroom rather
than on the battlefield, there is the more subtle and, in some ways, the more
serious problem of states adjudicating cases with such highly politicized content
that the political perspective of the prosecuting state (or individual prosecutor) is
inevitably consequential. Belgian magistrates operating under universal
jurisdiction, for example, have taken up investigations (with or without
subsequent indictment) of Ariel Sharon, Yasser Arafat, Henry Kissinger, Ali
Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, Fidel Castro, Saddam Hussein, and others. In such
politically charged contexts, the decision of which cases to pursue and which to
bypass cannot help but be informed by the political perspectives of the
prosecuting state or the individual prosecuting official. Precisely because
terrorism has a political component-and international terrorism has an
international political component-it would be naive to assume that the state
that would step forward to exercise universal jurisdiction would be more neutral
4
or impartial than the principally affected state.'
The fundamental quandary posed by the position of states as interested
parties in terrorism cases lies at the base of the political debate concerning the
best configuration of criminal jurisdiction over terrorism. The terrorism treaties,
with their "extradite-or-prosecute" clauses, have fallen short of resolving the
difficulties concerning jurisdiction over terrorist offenses. The extradite-orprosecute regime for jurisdiction over terrorism is flawed insofar as it relies on
states-nonneutral perpetrator states, nonneutral targeted states, or third-party
states that cannot be presumed to be, or will not be perceived to be, neutral.
Similarly, because of the political features of international terrorism, utilizing
universal or international jurisdiction for the prosecution of terrorist crimes also
does not satisfactorily fulfill the complex requirements for effective enforcement
in this field. The inherent political impediments to effective use of international
fora for the prosecution of terrorist offenses are well exemplified in the context
of the ICC.

III. THE ICC AS AN INTERNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT
MECHANISM
The political difficulties surrounding the use of international fora for the
prosecution of terrorist crimes are reflected in a number of legal constraints on
the powers of the ICC. These limitations concern the ICC's jurisdictional
14

For a more comprehensive consideration of the political implications of universal jurisdiction, see

Madeline H. Morris, UniversalJursdicfionin a Divided World: Conference Remarks, 35 New Eng L Rev
337 (2001).
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structure, its complementarity regime, and the international law of immunities.
Unsurprisingly, these legal limitations, which reflect states' political concerns, in
practice also place constraints on the ICC's capacity to effectively prosecute
crimes of international terrorism.
A. LIMITATIONS ARISING FROM THE ICC's JURISDICTIONAL
STRUCTURE

As the subject-matter jurisdiction of the ICC is currently defined, terrorist
crimes come within the jurisdiction of the ICC only if the particular terrorist acts
also constitute genocide, war crimes, or (as is more likely) crimes against
humanity.15 Therefore, only if a terrorist act comprised the elements of one of
those three crimes would that terrorist act come within ICC jurisdiction.16
Proposals to include terrorism per se within ICC jurisdiction were defeated in
the ICC Treaty negotiations process, in part because of the politically charged
disagreements between states as to the appropriate definition of "terrorism."
In addition to limitations on ICC powers based on subject-matter
jurisdiction, there are also limitations on the ICC's exercise of jurisdiction that
are based on nationality and territoriality. By the terms of the ICC Treaty, unless
the UN Security Council refers a case to the ICC, the ICC may exercise
jurisdiction only if the crime was committed by the national of or on the territory
of a state party to the ICC Treaty (or by the national of or on the territory of a
nonparty state that has consented to ad hoc ICC jurisdiction).17 Consequently,
crimes committed on the territory of a nonconsenting, nonparty state by the
national of a nonconsenting, nonparty state may not be prosecuted before the
ICC. These limitations on the ICC's exercise of jurisdiction preclude ICC
prosecution of terrorist acts committed by a nonconsenting, nonparty state's
national within his own state and terrorist acts committed by a nonconsenting,
nonparty state's national in a different nonparty state. Based on the current state
of ICC ratifications, these limitations would, for instance, have precluded ICC
prosecution of any of the nineteen hijackers responsible for the attacks of

15

16

17

See ICC Treaty, art 5 (cited in note 8). While the ICC Treaty also provides for jurisdiction over
the crime of aggression, see id, art 5(1)(d), the treaty further provides that the ICC shall not
exercise that part of its subject-matter jurisdiction until such time as the treaty is amended to
include provisions defining the crime of aggression and setting out the conditions under which
the court will exercise jurisdiction over that crime. See id, art 5(2).
Concerning the possibility of future expansion of the ICC's jurisdiction to include terrorism
crimes that do not constitute genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity, see subsection
III.D.
ICC Treaty, art 12 (cited in note 8).
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September 11, 2001 (had they survived and had the ICC been established at that
time).
In addition to those limitations on the ICC's exercise of jurisdiction that
are based on the terms of the ICC Treaty itself, there also is a question about
whether the ICC may lawfully exercise jurisdiction when the defendant is a
national of a nonconsenting, nonparty state-even if the crimes were committed
on the territory of a state party. Such an exercise of jurisdiction over a nonparty
national is permitted under the terms of the ICC Treaty. But some statesnotably the US-have argued that such ICC jurisdiction over nonparty nationals
would be unlawful. 8 This issue remains unresolved, as a political as well as a
legal matter. Since state sponsors of terrorism are unlikely to become parties to
the ICC Treaty, this issue will be of particular significance in relation to ICC
jurisdiction over terrorism offenses.
B. LIMITATIONS ARISING FROM THE ICC'S
COMPLEMENTARITY REGIME

An additional set of impediments to effective ICC jurisdiction over
terrorism offenses is posed by the ICC's "complementarity" regime,
encompassed in Articles 17-19 of the ICC Treaty. Under Article 17, a case is
admissible before the ICC only if the states that would otherwise have
jurisdiction are genuinely unable or unwilling to investigate and, where
appropriate, to prosecute the case in question. The complementarity regime was
designed to reflect the position, arrived at in the course of the ICC Treaty
negotiations, that states should retain primary authority and control over
prosecutions for international crimes, with the ICC serving as a fail-safe
enforcement mechanism of last resort.
The apparatus for implementing the complementarity regime, laid out in
Articles 18 and 19 of the ICC Treaty, may allow state sponsors of terrorism
opportunities to forestall, if not to prevent, terrorism prosecutions before the
1CC. Under Article 18, the ICC prosecutor is required to publicize his or her
intention to proceed with an investigation. Notice must be sent to all states
parties and to all states that would ordinarily exercise jurisdiction over the crimes
in question. At a minimum, this provision would require notice to the state
where the crime was committed and to the suspect's state of nationality. This
means that, where state-sponsored terrorism is involved, that state sponsor is
likely to be among the states entitled to early notice of the prosecutor's
18

For a comprehensive treatment of concerns regarding ICC jurisdiction over nonparty nationals,
see Morris, 64 L & Contemp Probs at 13 (cited in note 5). The arguments in that article formed
the legal basis of the US position on this issue. See David J. Scheffer, Staying the Course with the
International Criminal Court, 35 Cornell Intl L J 47, 66 n 68 (2002).
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intentions. The ICC Treaty does .provide that the prosecutor may make such
notice confidentially, and may limit the scope of information provided in order
to prevent the destruction of evidence or the absconding of suspects. But, where
a notified state is complicit with the suspects, those provisions cannot obviate
the potential disadvantage to the prosecution.
The obstacles to effective terrorism prosecutions that are posed by Article
18 do not end there. Within one month of receiving notice of investigation from
the ICC prosecutor, a state may inform the prosecutor that the state itself is
investigating or has investigated the crime in question, and may request that the
ICC prosecutor defer to the state's investigation. Having been so requested by a
state, the prosecutor may not proceed further with an investigation unless he
receives authorization to proceed from the ICC's Pre-Trial Chamber.' 9 Article 18
applies to all cases except those referred by the UN Security Council.
An additional determination of the admissibility of a case before the ICC
may also be made through a proceeding under Article 19 of the treaty. The
Article 19 procedure is applicable to all cases before the ICC, including those
based on a referral by the UN Security Council. Article 19 permits challenges
based on jurisdiction or admissibility. Such a challenge may be brought by the
accused, by a state with jurisdiction over the case, or by a state whose consent
would be required for the ICC to exercise jurisdiction over the case. If a
challenge is made by a relevant state, then "the Prosecutor shall suspend the
investigation until such time as the Court makes a determination in accordance
with article 17. " 2
The pretrial proceedings provided for under Articles 18 and 19 of the ICC
Treaty in these ways provide opportunities for a state to forestall an investigation
or prosecution. The ICC Treaty does provide that the court may give
exceptional authorization to the prosecutor to continue an investigation "where
there is a unique opportunity to obtain important evidence or there is a
significant risk that such evidence may not be subsequently available.",2 ' But,
once again, that safeguard, while ameliorating the problem, cannot eliminate it.
As noted above, Article 17 provides that a case shall not be admissible before
the ICC where that case is being investigated or prosecuted by a state with
jurisdiction over it-an exception is made where that state is determined by the

19

Under Article 18, if the Pre-Trial Chamber declines to authorize the continuation of investigation

20

by the ICC prosecutor, the prosecutor may reapply subsequently based on new facts or evidence.
A determination by the Pre-Trial Chamber on this issue may be appealed by the prosecutor or by
the relevant state. The prosecutor may apply for provisional measures in order to preserve
evidence during the course of Article 18 proceedings. ICC Treaty, art 18 (cited in note 8).
Id, art 19(7).

21

Id, art 18(6); see also id, art 95.
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ICC to be unable or unwilling genuinely to carry out the investigation or the
prosecution. If the ICC determines that a state is unable or unwilling
"genuinely" to proceed, then the ICC, by the terms of the Treaty, may exercise
jurisdiction even over the objection of that state. But much time will have passed
between the moment when the prosecutor informed a state of his intention to
investigate and the time when that state is determined to be-contrary to its
protestations-unwilling genuinely to investigate or to prosecute.
Cumulatively, the complementarity provisions of the ICC Treaty would
allow a state sponsor of terrorism to impede ICC prosecution of a case. The
ICC might, nevertheless, ultimately succeed in concluding an effective and
appropriate prosecution in some cases. In other cases, very likely, the ICC's
effectiveness will be limited by the exigencies of complementarity."
C. LIMITATIONS ARISING FROM THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF
IMMUNITIES
The international law of diplomatic, sovereign, and head-of-state
immunities embodies the principle of the sovereign equality of states (by
prohibiting one state from standing in judgment on the official acts or the head
of state of another state) and facilitates diplomatic relations (by prohibiting one
state from bringing legal process against a foreign diplomat present on its
territory). The law of immunities is thus intended both to reflect the
fundamental structures of international law and to facilitate peaceful interstate
relations.
If a high governmental official bears responsibility for the perpetration of a
terrorist crime (as may often be the case), that individual may be immune from
ICC jurisdiction under the international law of immunities. This problem is not
at all evident on the face of the ICC Treaty. Indeed, the Treaty clearly states that
immunities will not be recognized for the crimes now within the jurisdiction of
the court.2 3 However, the international law of immunities cannot in fact be
dispensed with so quickly. The problem becomes clear upon examination.
The best starting point for examination of this issue is the 2002 decision of
the ICJ in the Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic
Republic of the Congo v Belgium).24 The case concerned an international warrant,
issued by Belgium, for the arrest of the then foreign minister of the Democratic
Republic of Congo ("DRC") for crimes including crimes against humanity. The

22

See William A. Schabas, An Introductionto the InternationalCriminalCourt 101-03 (Cambridge 2001).

23

See ICC Treaty, art 27 (cited in note 8).

24

Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (DemocraticRepublic of the Congo v Belgium), 2002
ICJ 1213 (Feb 14, 2002).
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DRC claimed that the international law of immunities was violated by the
issuance of that warrant. The ICJ held:
The Court ...concludes that the functions of a Minister for Foreign Affairs
are such that, throughout the duration of his or her office, he or she when
abroad enjoys full immunity from criminal jurisdiction and inviolability.
That immunity and inviolability protect the individual concerned against any
which would hinder him or her in the
act of authority of another State
25
performance of his or her duties.
However, the ICJ majority went on to say that, even though a foreign minister
would be immune from criminal proceedings before the courts of another state,
an incumbent or former Minister for Foreign Affairs may be subject to
criminal proceedings before certain international criminal courts, where they
have jurisdiction. Examples include ...the future International Criminal
Court created by the 1998 Rome Convention. The latter's Statute expressly
provides, in Article 27, paragraph 2, that "[i]mmunities or special procedural
rules which may attach to the official capacity of a person, whether under
not bar the Court from exercising its
national or international law, shall
' '26
jurisdiction over such a person.
The ICJ appears to have spoken too broadly in this respect. In fact, if the
question is analyzed consistently with the ICJ majority's own holding on
immunities, the conclusion must be that the ICC would have the power to
prosecute an incumbent foreign minister (or other covered official) of a state
that is a party to the ICC Treaty, but would not be empowered to prosecute a
covered official of a state that is not a party to the treaty. This point becomes
clear when we consider the basis for the ICC's purported jurisdiction over
nationals of states that are not parties to the ICC Treaty.
The ICC Treaty provides that, under certain circumstances, the ICC may
exercise jurisdiction even over nationals of states that are not parties to the treaty
and have not otherwise consented to the court's jurisdiction. Article 12 provides
that, in addition to jurisdiction based on Security Council referral and
jurisdiction based on consent by the defendant's state of nationality, the ICC will
have jurisdiction to prosecute the national of any state when crimes within the
court's subject-matter jurisdiction are committed on the territory of a state that
27
is a party to the treaty or that consents ad hoc to ICC jurisdiction for that case.
That territorial basis would empower the court to exercise jurisdiction even in
cases where the defendant's state of nationality is not a party to the treaty and
does not consent to the exercise of jurisdiction.28

25

Id at 23,

54.

26

Id at 26,

61.

27

ICC Treaty, art 12 (cited in note 8).

28

The issue of ICC jurisdiction over nonparty nationals is addressed briefly in subsection III.B.
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Advocates of ICC jurisdiction over nonparty nationals argue that the
foundation for the ICC's jurisdiction over nonparty nationals when the crime is
committed on the territory of a state party is that the territorial state has
delegated its territorial jurisdiction to be exercised by the ICC. 29 The reasoning is
that, since the territorial state would have the right to prosecute for offenses
committed on its territory, the territorial state also has the right to delegate that
jurisdiction to be exercised by an international court.30
Offering a variant on this rationale, some proponents have contended that
ICC jurisdiction over the nationals of nonparty states is based upon the
principles of universal jurisdiction pursuant to which the courts of any state may
prosecute the nationals of any state for certain international crimes. Since any
individual state could prosecute perpetrators regardless of their nationality, it is
argued, a group of states may create an international court empowered to do the
same. Under this theory, each state party, in effect, delegates to the international
court its universal jurisdiction.3 1 Under either theory (delegated territorial
jurisdiction or delegated universal jurisdiction), the ICC's jurisdiction over
nationals of nonparty states rests on the delegated jurisdiction of one or more
states.
The overbreadth in the ICJ's reasoning concerning immunity before the
ICC now becomes clear. Obviously, states (the territorial state or, under the
delegated-universal-jurisdiction theory, any or all states parties) can delegate to
the ICC only such jurisdiction as those states have. If states are obliged to
recognize a certain immunity, as the ICJ's decision in Congo v Belgium requires,
then those states' delegated jurisdiction logically must carry that immunity with
it. The consequence is that, if states would be legally required to afford immunity
from prosecution to sitting heads of state, foreign ministers, and perhaps other
high officials, then the ICC (when acting without Security Council referral and
without the consent of the officials' state of nationality) would be similarly
constrained.
This immunity before the ICC would apply only to nonparty nationals; it
would not apply to officials of states parties to the ICC Treaty. States parties
waive the immunity of their officials under Article 27 of that treaty, which states
that "immunities . . .which may attach to the official capacity of a person ...

29
30

31

See, for example, Michael P. Scharf, The ICC's Jurisdiction over the Nationals of Non-Party States: A
Critique of the U.S. Position, 64 L & Contemp Probs 67 (2001).
For full and contrasting treatments of the issue of ICC jurisdiction over nonparty nationals, see
Morris, 64 L & Contemp Probs at 13 (cited in note 5); Scharf, 64 L & Contemp Probs at 67 (cited
in note 29).
See, for example, Scharf, 64 L & Contemp Probs at 77 (cited in note 29). For a critique of this
view, see Morris, 64 L & Contemp Probs at 26-52 (cited in note 5).
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shall not bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction over such a person." But
that treaty provision constitutes a waiver of immunity only by states that are
parties. The head of state or foreign minister of a nonparty state would maintain
immunity.3 2 So where an individual responsible for a terrorist crime is a head of
state, foreign minister or, perhaps, other high official of a nonparty state, the
ICC cannot lawfully exercise jurisdiction over that individual, at least not
consistently with international immunity principles as articulated in the ICJ's
decision in Congo v Belgium.
D. ADDITIONAL LIMITATIONS AFFECTING THE ICC'S
CAPACITY TO ADJUDICATE CRIMES ADDED BY AMENDMENT
TO THE ICC TREATY

The ICC Treaty limits the ICC's subject-matter jurisdiction to genocide,
war crimes, and crimes against humanity.3 3 However, in the negotiations leading
up to the adoption of the ICC Treaty, extensive debate focused on the
possibility of encompassing within the jurisdiction of the ICC certain "treaty
crimes"-including the terrorism crimes defined in the treaties on hijacking and
aircraft sabotage,3 4 crimes against internationally protected persons, 3 hostage
taking, 36 sabotage of marine navigation, 3' and the like. In the course of the
negotiations, the decision ultimately taken was to exclude those treaty crimes
from the jurisdiction of the court. 38 But Resolution E, adopted at the last

32

This conclusion is consistent with the thrust of Article 98(1) of the ICC Treaty, which provides
that:
[t]he Court may not proceed with a request for surrender or assistance which
would require the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations
under international law with respect to the State or diplomatic immunity of a
person or property of a third State, unless the Court can first obtain the
cooperation of that third State for the waiver of the immunity.
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ICC Treaty, art 98(1) (cited in note 8).
See text accompanying note 8.

35

See Seizure of Aircraft (cited in note 5); Montreal Convention (cited in note 2); Suppression of
Unlawful Acts at Airports (cited in note 5).
Protected Persons (cited in note 5).
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International Convention against the taking of hostages (cited in note 5).

37

Maritime Navigation (cited in note 5).
There were a number of reasons for excluding terrorist offenses (as well as drug trafficking and
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38

other "treaty crimes") from the jurisdiction of the ICC under the Rome Treaty. In part, the
attempt to include terrorist offenses failed because of states' disagreement over the proper
definition of "terrorism." See note 11. In addition, those who advocated exclusion of terrorism
argued that the ICC would be unable to investigate terrorism cases as efficiently and effectively as
national governments would be able to do and, also, that the inclusion of terrorism and drug
trafficking within ICC jurisdiction would overburden the limited investigative and prosecutorial
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moments of the Rome Conference at which the ICC Treaty was adopted,
provides for reconsideration of the inclusion of the "treaty crimes." Resolution
E states that the Rome Conference,
[a]ffirm[s] that the Statute of the ICC provides for a review mechanism,
which allows for an expansion in future of the jurisdiction of the Court,
[and] [r]ecommends that a Review Conference .. .consider the crimes of
terrorism and drug crimes with a view to arriving at an acceptable definition
39
and their inclusion in the list of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.
Therefore, crimes of terrorism-even when they do not constitute genocide, war
crimes, or crimes against humanity-may be brought within ICC jurisdiction in
the future.
If the ICC Treaty is amended in the future to include terrorist crimes that
constitute genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity, the
not
do
limitations on the ICC's capacity to prosecute those additional offenses will be
greater than those that affect the ICC's jurisdiction over the crimes currently
within its jurisdiction. In addition to the existing limitations based on
jurisdictional structure, complementarity, and immunities that affect
prosecutions for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, there is a
further significant limitation that will apply to offenses added to the jurisdiction
of the ICC through amendment of the ICC Treaty. Article 121(5) of the Treaty
states: "In respect of a State Party which has not accepted the amendment, the
Court shall not exercise its jurisdiction regarding a crime covered by the
4°
amendment when committed by that State Party's nationals or on its territory."
The ICC treaty amendment process is based on the vote of a super-majority of
ICC states parties.41 The limiting provision in Article 121(5) was included
because states parties were not prepared to relegate future decisions concerning
ICC jurisdiction over crimes committed on their territories or by their nationals
to a supermajority of ICC states parties. Consequently, with regard to states
parties, the ICC would have jurisdiction over terrorist crimes added by
amendment ony if the crime were committed by the national of a state and on
the territory of a state that had accepted the addition of that particular crime to
the jurisdiction of the ICC.

39

40
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resources of the ICC. See, for example, United Nations, Comments of the United States of America
Pursuant to Paragraph 4 of General Assembly Resolution 49/53 on the Establishment of an International
CriminalCourt, Report of the Secretary General,UN Doc No A/AC.244/1 /Add.2 at 10-13 (1995).
United Nations, Final Act of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on
the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, UN Doc No A/CONF. 183/10 at Annex
I, Res E (1998).
ICC Treaty, art 121(5) (cited in note 8).
Id, art 121(3).
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The implications of Article 121(5) are less clear for states that are not
parties to the ICC Treaty. While the Treaty allows states parties to opt out of
ICC jurisdiction over added offenses, the Treaty appears, ironically, to assert
ICC jurisdiction over nonparty nationals for those same added offenses. The US
has proposed language, to be included in the Rules of Procedure for the ICC
Assembly of States Parties, which would provide that,
[w]ith respect to a crime added by amendment to the Statute pursuant to
article 121, paragraph 5, the court may exercise jurisdiction only if the

amendment has entered into force for both the State of nationality of the
alleged perpetrator and the State in whose territory the crime was
42
committed.
That proposal has not been adopted to date, and this issue remains the
subject of controversy.4 3 What is clear, at a minimum, is that, if terrorism
offenses are added to the jurisdiction of the ICC, states parties may decline to
accept this jurisdiction. This opt-out provision represents a significant additional
limitation that would affect the ICC's capacity to prosecute terrorist crimes
added to the ICC's jurisdiction through amendment of the ICC Treaty.
E. THE POTENTIAL FOR ICC TERRORISM PROSECUTIONS IN
CONJUNCTION WITH ACTION BY THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL

In sum, when the ICC acts in the absence of a Security Council referral, its
ability to exercise jurisdiction over terrorist crimes is limited in a variety of ways
reflecting underlying international political concerns. Those constraints may be
substantially circumvented in the event that the UN Security Council, acting
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, refers the case in question to the ICC.
Under the terms of the ICC Treaty, when the Security Council refers a
case, it is not a precondition to the exercise of the ICC's jurisdiction that the
territorial state or the defendant's state of nationality be a party to the treaty.44
Complementarity likely also can be circumvented through the use of a Chapter
VII resolution (though this is less clear). 4' The reasoning here is that, acting
under Chapter VII, the Security Council could effectively require a state to
forego domestic handling of a case in order for the ICC to handle the matter.
Immunities, evidently, can be abrogated by Chapter VII resolutions, as was done

42

43
44
45

Working Group on Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Proposal Submitted by the United States of

America Concerning Rules of Evidence and ProcedureRelating to Part 13 of the Statute (FinalClauses) 2, UN
Doc No PCNICC/2000/WGRPE(13)/DP.1 (2000).
See Scheffer, 35 Cornell Intl LJ at 81 (cited in note 18).
See ICC Treaty, arts 12(2) and 13 (cited in note 8).
See Ruth B. Philips, The InternationalCourt Statute:JurisdictionandAdmissibility, 10 Crim L Forum 61,
73, 81 (1999).
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the International Criminal
in the Chapter VII resolutions that established
46
Rwanda.
and
Yugoslavia
Tribunals for the former
If the Security Council were to refer a case to the ICC, and thereby to use
its Chapter VII powers to augment the powers of the ICC 47 (or, for that matter,
if the Security Council were to create a separate ad hoc international criminal
tribunal to address some particular situation, or were to use its Chapter VII
powers to augment or supplement the authority of national courts), we would
return, full circle, to the posture of the Lockerbie case, where resort was made to
the UN Security Council as the authority "above" the state. In this way, as in so
many others, the Security Council wields superordinate powers within the
international legal system.
IV. CONCLUSION
The likely involvement of states as targets or sponsors of terrorism has
created an impetus to internationalize law enforcement in this field through the
use of UN Security Council powers, international criminal courts, or universal
jurisdiction. But the international political features of international terrorism
significantly limit the potential scope and efficacy of such internationalizing
mechanisms. Consequently, the prosecution of terrorism cases to date is pursued
primarily at the national level, largely in the targeted state. Given the underlying
factors shaping this practice, this arrangement, as imperfect as it is, likely will,
and quite probably should, remain in place for the foreseeable future.

46

See United Nations, Statute of the International Criminal Tribunalforthe Prosecution of PersonsResponsible
for Serious Violations of InternationalHumanitarianLaw Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia
since 1991, art 7(2), in Report of the Secretary-GeneralPursuantto Paragraph2 of Securiey Council Resolution
808, Annex, UN Doc No S/25704 (1993); United Nations, Security Council Res No 955, UN
Doc S/RES/955 at art 6(2) (1994).
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The present Article will not consider the actual likelihood of Security Council referrals to the ICC,
which may be remote given the relevant political factors, including US objections to provisions of
the ICC Treaty. For general discussion regarding US objections to the ICC Treaty, see Morris, 64
L & Contemp Probs at 13 (cited in note 5).
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